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Foreign financial institutions represent a gigantic force in the American
banking industry today. As of June 30, 1988, there were 675 U.S. offices of
foreign banks in the United States holding in the aggregate more than $330
billion of deposits, or more than 16 percent of total U.S. banks' deposits, and
about $640 billion in assets, or nearly 22 percent of total U.S. banks' assets.' All
statistics obtained from American Banker Top Numbers Update (1989). Foreign
presence in the American financial community is expected to grow. Although the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) 2 generally does not directly affect foreign financial institutions'
operations in the United States, the consequences of this massive restructuring
law on U.S. banking institutions3 will inevitably affect foreign institutions.
Understanding what the competition faces and a concept of where the United
States Government, particularly the banking institutions' regulators, believes the
financial industry should move, is essential for foreign banking institutions.
This article highlights those key provisions of FIRREA with which foreign
institutions should be familiar, especially with respect to the consolidation of
U.S. financial institutions, limitations on banking institutions' operations, the
special powers of the banking regulators, and enforcement actions involving
banking institutions and their representatives (including foreign banks).
*Mr. Gail is a member of the Texas Bar and practices law in the Financial Institutions and Real
Estate Sections of Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. All statistics obtained from AMERICAN BANKER Top NUMBERS UPDATE (1989).
2. P.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 1983 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA]. FIRREA was roughly 1,000
pages as passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush on August 9, 1989.
3. The term "banking institutions" is used generically to refer to all commercial banks and
savings associations.
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I. Banking Deposits
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has replaced the defunct
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as the insurer of
savings associations and continues as the insurer of bank deposits. 4 There are two
separate insurance funds: the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), which is essentially a
continuation of the FDIC's existing fund, the Permanent Insurance Fund, 5 and
the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), which replaces the FSLIC
insurance fund.6 Assessment rates are established by the FDIC annually for each
fund independently of one another. Until 1998, SAIF premiums will be
significantly higher than BIF premiums. 7 Banking institutions that do not meet
the minimum capital standards-"troubled institutions"--are prohibited from
accepting, renewing, or rolling over brokered deposits. 8 Troubled institutions
also may not offer interest rates "significantly higher" than prevailing rates
being offered by similar institutions in their market area. 9 That provision is
aimed at the operations of an institution's money desk.' 0
II. Consolidation of the Industry
A. CONVERSIONS
Although no banking institution may participate in a "conversion
transaction"--basically an acquisition or merger transaction that results in
deposits moving from SAIF to BIF, or vice versa-without the FDIC's prior
approval prior to August 1994,11 savings associations may switch their charters
to bank charters (upon application to and subject to the approval of the
appropriate federal banking agency) at any time so long as the resulting bank
remains a member of SAIF (and pays the higher SAIF assessment rates) for the
remainder of the moratorium period. 12 The moratorium also does not apply to a
bank holding company that merges or transfers the assets and liabilities of any
savings association it controls with or to its bank subsidiary, subject to the
approval of the appropriate federal banking agency and the Federal Reserve
Board.1 3 A portion of the bank's resulting deposits, however, will be assessed
at the SAIF premium rates and that amount of income deposited with the
4. FIRREA §§ 205 and 206(a), Federal Deposit Insurance Act [hereinafter FDIA] §§ 4 and 5,
12 U.S.C. H3 1814 and 1815.
5. FIRREA § 211(3), FDIA § I1(a)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(5).
6. FIRREA § 211(3), FDIA § I1(a)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6).
7. F1RREA § 208, FDIA § 7(b)(1)(A) and (C), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A) and (C).
8. FIRREA § 224(a) and (b), FDIA § 29(a).
9. FIRREA § 224(a), FDIA § 29(f)(3).
10. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 508 (1989).
11. FIRREA § 206(a)(7), FDIA § 5(d)(2)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(A).
12. FIRREA § 206(a)(7), FDIA § 5(d)(2)(G), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(G).
13. FIRREA § 206(a)(7), FDIA § 5(d)(3)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(3)(A).
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SAIF. 14 Every banking institution participating in a conversion transaction
(including branch sales and purchases) must pay both exit and entrance fees to
the appropriate insurance fund in amounts determined by the FDIC. 15
B. BANK HOLDING COMPANY (BHC) ACQUISITIONS OF HEALTHY THRIFTS
The Federal Reserve Board has adopted a new policy 16 permitting BHCs to
acquire any savings association, healthy or sick, as long as the acquired thrift
institution engages only in deposit activities and lending and other activities
permissible for BHCs. 17 Further, the only restrictions on transactions permitted
by FIRREA to be imposed by the Federal Reserve Board between a savings
association and its BHC affiliates are the affiliate transaction rules applicable to
all BHCs. 18 Tandem operations restrictions previously imposed have been lifted.' 9
C. PASSIVE INVESTMENTS BY NONBANK BANKS
FIRREA has clarified and expanded a provision of existing law2 0 exempting
certain companies controlling nonbank banks from treatment as BHCs even
when such companies obtain control of more than 5 percent of the shares or
assets of an additional banking institution.
2 1
III. Dealing with Failed or Failing Institutions
A. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION
FIRREA established a corporate instrumentality of the United States known as
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), 22 with its primary mission to manage
and resolve all savings associations for which a conservator or receiver had been
appointed between January 1, 1989, and August 9, 1989, or is appointed during
the thirty-six month period from August 9, 1989, to August 9, 1992, and to
dispose of all of the assets of such institutions.2 3 The FDIC acts as RTC's
"exclusive manager" to conduct all of the RTC's activities. 24 Overall RTC/
FDIC strategy and general policy guidelines are established by an Oversight
14. FIRREA § 206(a)(77), FDIA § 5(d)(3)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(3)(B).
15. FIRREA § 206(a)(7), FDIA § 5(d)(2)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(E). The FDIC has
adopted a BIF entrance fee equal to 80¢ per $1,000 of deposits. 54 Fed. Reg. 40,377 (1989).
16. 54 Fed. Reg. 37,297 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(9)).
17. Bank Holding Company Act [hereinafter BHCA] § 4(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).
18. FIRREA § 601(a), BHCA § 4(i)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i)(2).
19. FRB Removes Tandem Operations Restrictions for BHC-Acquired Thrifts, Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 87,770 (Aug. 21, 1989).
20. BHCA § 4(f), 12 U.S.C. § 3204(9).
21. FIRREA § 603(a), BHCA § 4(f)(2)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f)(2)(A)(ii).
22. FIRREA § 501(a), Federal Home Loan Bank Act [hereinafter FHLBA] § 21A(b)(1).
23. FIRREA § 501(a); FHLBA § 21A(b)(3).
24. FIRREA § 501(a), FHLBA § 21A(b)(1)(C).
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Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and two persons from the private sector appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 25
Among its special powers to resolve failed institutions within its jurisdiction,
the RTC/FDIC may: require a merger or consolidation of institutions; 26 organize
new federal savings associations; 27 organize bridge banks with respect to failed
institutions that become banks; 28 and own voting and nonvoting equity securities
and warrants or other participation interests in the institutions or their assets.29
The FDIC anticipates hiring in excess of 5,000 employees to administer the
management and resolution of the failed thrifts and the disposal of their assets.
B. FDIC's POWERS AS RECEIVER OR CONSERVATOR
FIRREA made a comprehensive amendment to section 11 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act to define the FDIC's authorities and duties as conservator
or receiver. 30 The authorities given the FDIC essentially parallel those previously
given the FDIC and FSLIC and are intended to permit the FDIC to take whatever
actions may be necessary to resolve the problems created by defaulted banking
institutions.31 In its capacity as either conservator or receiver, the FDIC succeeds
to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges with respect to the institution and its
assets; may operate the institution and conduct all of its business; may collect
obligations, preserve and conserve the assets and property of the institution; must
pay all valid obligations in accordance with the limitations of FIRREA; may take
any action it deems in the best interest of the institution, the depositors, or the
FDIC; may merge banking institutions or transfer any of their assets or liabilities
without any approval, assignment, or consent; and may repudiate burdensome
contracts or leases.3 2
C. POWER TO REPUDIATE CONTRACTS AND LEASES
FIRREA codifies, expands, and clarifies what has been described as a federal
common law right of an FDIC receiver or conservator to repudiate burdensome
contracts and leases. 33 As receiver or conservator the FDIC may within a "rea-
sonable period" following its appointment disaffirm or repudiate any contract or
25. FIRREA § 501(a), FHLBA § 21A(a).
26. FIRREA § 501(a), FHLBA § 21A(b)(1 l)(A)(iii).
27. FIRREA § 501(a), FHLBA § 21A(b)(I l)(A)(iv).
28. FIRREA § 501(a), FHLBA § 21A(b)(l l)(A)(v).
29. FIRREA § 501(a), FHLBA § 21A(b)(10)(H).
30. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA §§ I l(c)-(1), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c)-(I).
31. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 330-31 (1989).
32. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § 11(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2).
33. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 31, at 331.
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lease to which the institution was a party, the performance of which the FDIC in
its discretion determines to be burdensome and the disaffirmance or repudiation
of which would promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs.
34
Except for certain financial contracts, 35 the recovery against a receiver or con-
servator for repudiation or disaffirmance of a contract is expressly limited to actual
direct compensatory damages measured as of the date of the appointment of the
conservator or receiver. Liability of the receiver or conservator for any other
damages, including punitive or exemplary damages, damages for lost profits or
opportunity, or damages for pain and suffering, is expressly encluded.3 6
D. D'OENCH DOCTRINE
Section 1823(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act contains statutory
codification of the common law doctrine known as the D'Oench Doctrine, so
named after the Supreme Court's decision in D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC
37
(although the statute did not preempt the Court's holding). The doctrine estops
a debtor from asserting defenses based on side or secret agreements tending to
mislead a federal insurance agency as to the terms of an asset it acquires, such
as a promissory note, upon the failure of a financial institution. Prior to FIRREA,
section 1823(e) was applicable to the FDIC in its corporate capacity only,
although the courts had extended the D'Oench Doctrine's application to the
FDIC in its receivership capacity as well as to the FSLIC in its corporate and
receivership capacities.38 FIRREA codified these extensions by clarifying that
the D'Oench Doctrine is applicable to the FDIC in both of its capacities-
corporate and receiver-and whether the FDIC is acting in connection with a
bank or savings association. 39 The doctrine also now shields the assets acquired
by bridge banks organized by the FDIC to resolve banks in default, 4 0 and
FIRREA has extended the D'Oench Doctrine to cover liabilities.41
E. CLAIMS PROCEDURES AGAINST RECEIVERS
FIRREA made significant changes to the procedures to be followed by the
FDIC in processing and making determinations of claims brought against the
FDIC in its capacity as receiver of banking institutions. The changes are
34. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § ll(e)(I)-(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)(2).
35. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § ll(e)(3)(C) and (e)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(C) and (e)(8).
36. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § I I(e)(3)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A)-(B).
37. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
38. See, e.g., Andrew D. Taylor Trust v. Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 844 F.2d 337 (6th
Cir. 1988); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Investors Assocs. X., Ltd., 775 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1985);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. First Nat'l Fin. Corp., 587 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1978); Federal Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp. v. LeFeve, 676 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
39. FIRREA § 217(4), FDIA § 13(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
40. FIRREA § 214, FDIA § I I(n)(4)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I).
41. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § 11(d)(9), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9).
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constructed to respond to the constitutional and statutory concerns raised by the
United States Supreme Court in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC.4 2 It
is congressional intent that the claims determination procedure meet the
concerns raised by the Court in the Coit case while enabling the FDIC to
dispose of the bulk of claims expeditiously and fairly. 43 Claimants must exhaust
the FDIC administrative procedures to determine claims, although the FDIC
must make a determination within a specified time period, and then may either
bring the claim de novo in United States district court or elect a de novo hearing
under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act.4 n There will be no judicial
review of the FDIC's determination not to allow a claim.4 5 A claimant's only
remedy will be to file suit (or continue a previously filed suit) on the merits of
the claim or elect an administrative hearing on the merits of the claim. If a
claimant elects an administrative adjudication of its claim, judicial review of the
outcome will be pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than de
novo.
46
F. FDIC ASSISTANCE TO DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
The Act amends section 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act4 7 governing
the FDIC's powers to assist insured banks. Overall the FDIC's powers and
authorities to assist institutions by purchasing assets, making loans or deposits,
assuming liabilities, or making contributions (open bank assistance) are extended
to cover all banking institutions to prevent their closing or restore them to normal
operations.
G. BRANCHING PROVISIONS
If a bank or bank holding company acquires a savings association as part of an
emergency acquisition transaction, the savings association may retain and
operate its existing branches and other existing facilities. If the thrift continues
to exist as a separate entity it may open and operate new branches to the same
extent as any other savings association whose home office is located in the same
state as that of the thrift and which is not affiliated with a bank holding
company.4 8 A savings association loses those branching rights and is limited to
the branching rights a bank has in the state where the thrift is located if (i) the
bank holding company does not own a bank in the state where the thrift's home
42. 109 S. Ct. 1361 (1989).
43. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 31, at 418-19.
44. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § I I(d)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).
45. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § Il(d)(5)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(E).
46. FIRREA § 212(a), FDIA § I1(d)(6)(7), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(7).
47. FIRREA § 217(3)(E), FDIA § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 1823.
48. FIRREA § 217(8), FDIA § 13(k)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k)(4)(A).
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office is located and (ii) the thrift fails to meet the domestic building and loan
association asset tests of the Internal Revenue Code.49
H. LIABILITY OF COMMONLY CONTROLLED BANKING INSTITUTIONS
Banking institutions will be liable for losses incurred by the FDIC, and which
the FDIC reasonably anticipates incurring, after August 9, 1989, in connection
with the default of a "commonly controlled" banking institution or assistance
provided to a commonly controlled banking institution in danger of default.
50
The FDIC may waive the application of the cross-guaranty if it determines that
such an exemption is in the best interest of the BIF or the SAIF. 5 1 Excluded from
the definition of commonly controlled institutions are those the control of which
is obtained by virtue of the acquisition of voting shares acquired in securing or
collecting a debt previously contracted in good faith. This exclusion is available
for a period of five years following the date of acquisition or such longer period
approved by the FDIC.52 An institution must pay the amount of its liability for
losses upon receipt of written notice from the FDIC of the loss. Such written
notice of liability must be given within two years from the date the FDIC incurs
the loss or the banking institution will not be liable. 53 There is a broad restraint
on the right of private parties from limiting or impairing the ability of a banking
institution to meet its cross-guaranty obligations.
54
IV. Limitations on Loans, Investments
and Activities of Banking Institutions
A. THRIFT ACrivITIES
Congress considered the loan and investment powers of thrift savings
associations, especially the powers of state chartered thrifts, to be a prime cause
of the savings and loan industry disaster.55 Therefore, one of the purposes of
FIRREA is to curtail investments and other activities of thrifts that pose
unacceptable risks to the insurance funds. 56 FIRREA accomplishes this purpose
in the following manner: (1) there is a substantial decrease in the lending limits
of thrifts (formerly equal to 100 percent of capital) to the level of national banks
49. FIRREA § 271(8), FDIA § 13(k)(4)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k)(4)(B).
50. FIRREA § 206(a), FDIA § 5(e)(l)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(I)(A). Institutions are com-
monly controlled if they are controlled by the same banking institution holding company or one
banking institution is controlled by another. FIRREA § 206(a), FDIA § 5(e)(9), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(e)(9).
51. FIRREA § 206(a), FDIA § 5(e)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(5).
52. FIRREA § 206(a), FDIA § 5(e)(7), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(7).
53. FIRREA § 206(a), FDIA § 5(e)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(1)(B).
54. FIRREA § 206(a), FDIA § 5(e)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(4).
55. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1989).
56. FIRREA § 101.
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(15 percent of capital); 57 (2) there is a nearly equal substantial decrease in the
amount of nonresidential real estate secured loans that a savings association may
make (reduced to four times capital); 58 (3) the FDIC may outlaw any specific
activity it deems a serious threat to the SAIF;59 (4) there are special loan and
investment limits on state chartered thrifts to restrict them to the activities of a
federally chartered thrift;60 (5) investments in "junk bonds" are prohibited and
investments in commercial paper and corporate debt securities are curtailed;6 t
and (6) subsidiaries engaged in activities not permitted for national banks must
be separately capitalized.62
B. LOAN TO VALUE RATIOS
Specific loan to value ratios are not part of FIRREA, but the Congress has
directed the federal banking agencies to consider the following standards for all
banking institutions: 63 95 percent of appraised value for a loan to finance the
purchase of or refinance property improved by a completed one- to four-family
dwelling; 80 percent of the appraised value for a loan secured by property
improved by any other kind of completed structure; 70 percent of the appraised
value for a loan secured by improved property lacking any completed structure;
and 65 percent of the appraised value for a loan secured by raw land (other than
a loan to an active farming operation secured by agricultural land).
C. REAL ESTATE APPRAISALS
FIRREA promotes the adoption by all of the federal regulatory agencies of
nearly uniform appraisal standards and effectively forces each of the states to
establish certification and licensing programs to ensure that all appraisers meet
minimum qualifications. By July 1, 1991, all appraisals performed in connection
with "federally related real estate transactions" (which is virtually every real
estate related transaction any banking regulatory agency engages in, contracts
for, or regulates, and which requires the services of an appraiser) must be
performed only by persons certified or licensed in accordance with FIRREA
mandated requirements.
6 4
D. LIMITATION ON CERTAIN CONTRACTS
No insured banking institution may enter into oral or written contracts with any
person to provide goods, products or services if the performance of such
57. FIRREA § 301, Home Owner's Loan Act [hereinafter HOLA] § 5(u).
58. FIRREA § 301, HOLA § 5(c)(2)(B)(i).
59. FIRREA § 2221(4), FDIA § 18(m), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m).
60. FIRREA § 222, FDIA § 28(a).
61. FIRREA § 222, FDIA § 28(d); FIRREA § 301 HOLA § 5(c)(2)(D).
62. FIRREA § 301, HOLA § 5(t)(5).
63. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, supra note 10, at 402.
64. FIRREA § 1101.
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contracts would adversely affect the safety or soundness of the institution
involved. The FDIC will promulgate regulations to carry out this prohibition.65
E. QUALIFIED THRIFT LENDER TEST
In 1987, Congress designed the "qualified thrift lender" test (QTL)66 to
encourage savings institutions to commit themselves to the role of providing
housing-related finance and punish those institutions that do not. Reflecting
congressional intent to force savings institutions to offer housing- and consumer-
related credit, QTL status is now conditioned upon an association maintaining 70
percent (up from 60 percent) of its assets in a much narrower list of "qualified
thrift investments.' 67
The new QTL statute supersedes the existing statute as of July 1, 1991. A
thrift failing to maintain QTL status will have to convert to a bank charter, but
will have to pay the higher SAIF assessment fees through 1993 and pay exit and
entrance fees to the insurance funds. 68
F. CROS-MARKETING PRACTICES PERMITTED
As amended by FIRREA, the savings and loan holding company statutory
provisions do not contain cross-marketing prohibitions on diversified holding
companies. Formerly, 69 savings association subsidiaries of diversified holding
companies could not offer or market products or services of an affiliate unless the
products or services were ones lawfully offered by bank holding companies.
Similarly, the products or services of the thrift could not be offered or marketed
by or through an affiliate unless the affiliate was engaged only in activities
permitted for bank holding companies whose thrifts are QTL institutions. This
change is especially important to nonfinancial institution holding companies. For
example, now an automobile manufacturer may market consumer financing of its
cars through its thrift subsidiary or affiliate. This change, coupled with the
continued ability of unitary savings and loan holding companies and their
subsidiaries to engage in activities virtually without restriction70 (unlike bank
holding companies7 1), appears to make it more attractive than before for
nonfinancial institution companies to acquire savings and loan associations.
65. The Attorney General and the Comptroller General are directed to conduct a study to
determine the extent to which institutions are entering into contracts with vendors under agreements
by which the vendors purchase stock or assets from the institution or invest in the institution's
capital. The purpose of the study is to determine whether such practices are having an anticompetitive
effect and should be prohibited. FIRREA § 225, FDIA § 30(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1811(30)(e).
66. National Housing Act [hereinafter NHA] § 408(o), 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(o).
67. FIRREA § 303(a), HOLA § 10(m).
68. FIRREA § 303(a), HOLA § 10(m)(3)(A) and (E).
69. NHA § 408(p)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1730a(p)(2).
70. FIRREA § 301, HOLA § 10(c)(3).
71. BHCA § 4(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).
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V. Capital Standards
A. THRiFT STANDARDS
Perhaps the most important and controversial provisions of FIRREA are those
that establish new capital standards for savings associations. 72 Thrift capital
standards are modeled upon those imposed on national banks and are intended to
be on a parity with national bank standards by January 1, 1995. All savings
associations are required to maintain a minimum leverage limit or ratio of core
capital to assets of not less than 3 percent, and minimum tangible capital-core
capital minus intangible assets-of not less than 1.5 percent of total assets. 73
Thrifts are also required to meet a risk-based capital requirement, which is a ratio
of the total of an institution's capital to specified weighted values of the
individual components of that institution's assets and off-balance sheet items.
The risk-based component will reach 8 percent of risk-weighted assets by
January 1, 1993. 74
VI. Enforcement Provisions
Virtually all of the enforcement provisions of section 8 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act have been made applicable to all branches or agencies of foreign
banks or commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks. 75
This is especially significant because FIRREA has dramatically raised the level
of the federal banking regulators' civil enforcement powers by expanding their
ability to issue cease-and-desist orders and impose civil money penalties (of as
much as $1 million per day).76 The criminal bank fraud statute penalties have
also been greatly increased.77
72. FIRREA § 301, HOLA § 5(s) and (0.
73. 54 Fed. Reg. 46,845 (1989).
74. 54 Fed. Reg. 46,845 (1989).
75. FIRREA § 204(c), FDIA § 3(c)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(3).
76. See, e.g., FIRREA § 902(a), FDIA § 8(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) and FIRREA § 907(a),
FDIA § 8(i)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2).
77. See, e.g., FIRREA § 961.
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